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I. INTRODUCTION
The cork from a champagne bottle. The ramp meter turning
green. Kids running from school at the start of vacation. None of
these releases can compare to the release Congress gave broadcast-
ers in 1996. The closest comparison is the Oklahoma Land Rush.
Everyone interested knew what was coming and was prepared for it,
but nobody could move until the gun went off. The radio consoli-
dation spectrum rush lasted four years. This consolidation had a
major impact on radio station valuation and on valuation method-
ology.
This article analyzes the manner in which the broadcasting in-
dustry calculates the value of radio stations and discusses the im-
t Founding partner of the Law Firm of Terrance W. Moore, L.L.P., repre-
senting business clients, including most of Minnesota's radio stations, on matters
ranging from transactions to general legal advice to litigation. B.S. 1985, St.
John's University (MN);J.D. 1988, University of Minnesota Law School.
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pact of consolidation on these values since implementation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereinafter "the 1996 Act").
The 1996 Act had a profound effect on the market for radio
stations by releasing decades of pent-up demand for consolidation.
The release of this pent-up demand resulted in a rush for radio
spectrum not unlike a real estate boom. Suddenly, sellers were ob-
taining higher prices than they had dared to dream of. Buyers
were racing to acquire as many properties as possible, as quickly as
possible. This led to further escalation of prices as buyers engaged
in bidding wars for attractive properties. As in a real estate boom,
many of the acquisitions were made without regard to their former
value.
II. How To EVALUATE RADIO SPECTRUM
Radio spectrum is like real estate. If you own a parcel of real
estate, you have a group of exclusive rights regarding that land.
Nobody can visit it without your permission. Nobody can pass
through without an easement or an invitation. Nobody can do any-
thing with the property unless they first secure the rights from you.
Ownership of real estate also carries certain obligations. The
owner must keep the property in a reasonably safe condition. The
owner is responsible for any pollution on the property. The owner
may build as he likes, but not without restriction.
Like a real estate owner, the broadcast license holder has cer-
tain rights and obligations regarding the spectrum he controls.
The broadcaster is protected in a geographic area from other sig-
nals. Because radio waves are a tangible, physical phenomenon,
they can interfere with each other. To prevent this interference,
radio spectrum is allocated in a plat-like system. Each station is as-
signed a channel and a signal strength.' This system prevents sta-
1. The allocation system is a complex one, worthy of its own article. For this
article, it is enough to observe that stations are protected from other stations by
minimum distance separations. The separation requirement is determined as a
function of the classes of the involved stations and the proximity of their fre-
quencies. A station's class determines its Effective Radiated Power (ERP), which is
a combination of broadcast power and height. Higher ERP means more protec-
tion. Stations closer in frequency to each other must be separated by greater dis-
tances. Thus, two high ERP (Class C) stations on the same channel must be 180
miles apart, while two low ERP stations (Class A) on the third adjacent channel
need only nineteen miles of separation. 47 C.F.R. § 73.207 (2000). After the third
adjacent channel there is no real protection, so two Class C stations can be built in
the same city, as long as their channels are not in proximity.
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tion signals from interfering with each other. It also creates in the
licensee an exclusive right to broadcast, just as the real estate owner
has an exclusive right to build on his property. No one may en-
croach on the signal, no one may broadcast in the protected area
and no one may use the station without the licensee's permission.
Owning a radio station also carries with it certain obligations.
You may not broadcast at a higher power than your license author-
izes. This is called "overmodulation." Overmodulation leads to in-
terference with your neighbors on the spectrum. Like zoning set-
backs, this system protects neighbors from each other. You may
not broadcast indecent material. Like the owner of contaminated
real estate, the broadcaster is generally responsible for indecent
material on his station regardless of whether he put it there.
With these similarities in mind, it is not surprising to find that
radio stations have traditionally been appraised much like real es-
tate. For example, vacant land has value, as does a radio station li-
cense. Improved land, functioning at its highest and best use and
generating cash flow, is appraised for its business value more than
for the value of the land and improvements.
A. Stick Value-The Vacant Lot Of Spectrum
The broadcast license gives the holder an exclusive right to
broadcast in a particular part of the dial in that market. This is
similar to owning a vacant lot. Like an unimproved lot in a desir-
able location, a radio station license that is not profitable still has
significant value. In broadcasting, this is known as "Stick Value."
The value of a license will never go below the Stick Value, no mat-
ter how badly the station performs.
Like real estate, Stick Value is about location and size. A va-
cant commercial lot in a small town will have value, but not nearly
the value of the same lot in Manhattan or even Minneapolis. Like-
wise, a radio station that is losing money or not even operating will
have value wherever it is located, but it will have much more value
in a rated market than a small town. Location and power are criti-
cal. Wherever located, a large (high power) station will have con-
siderably more value than a small one.
Stick Value can be a potent concept. In 2000, Blue Chip
Broadcasting found a way to move a radio station from Glencoe,
MN (in McLeod County; population 34,522)2 closer to Minneapo-
2. http:// www.census.gov (last visitedJan. 31, 2001).
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lis. Blue Chip purchased that station for $20 million. Everybody
involved in the move made money. As a Glencoe station, its value
would not have approached $10 million, so the seller did better
than he could have hoped. As a Minneapolis station, Blue Chip en-
tered a market where the Stick Value for a full power station is
about $50 million. The Blue Chip property is licensed in the ex-
treme west of the Minneapolis metropolitan area, so its Stick Value
is somewhat less than if is it was in the center of the market. Never-
theless, before it generated a dime of revenue, Blue Chip had cre-
ated a $30 million property.
Like real estate, Stick Values are influenced by comparable
sales. In 1983, Stick Values in Minneapolis reached $3.8 million
dollars with the sale of KTWN-FM to Transtar. Transtar never
made money with the station, but sold it several years later for $8
million. In 1991, Minnesota Public Radio paid $12 million dollars
for a station to broadcast non-commercially. By 1998, CBS pur-
chased the stations owned by Nationwide Insurance and allocated a
rumored $40 million for the purchase of KMJZ, a high ERP station
that had never generated significant cash flow. Comparable sales,
however, are not the only factor that affects Stick Value.
Stick Value is the minimum value of the potential of a market.
Important market considerations include the amount of retail sales
in a market, the total revenue of radio stations in the market and
the number of stations in the market.
Retail sales define the potential of a market because of the di-
rect correlation between retail revenue and advertising budgets
and the direct correlation between advertising budgets and radio
revenue. Radio revenue varies widely, but are usually between .003
and .005 times a market's retail sales. More retail sales in a market
creates a bigger revenue pie for the stations to divide, thus adding
to the market's Stick Value.
While retail sales have a direct effect on the size of the radio
pie, total radio revenues are a direct measure of the market's per-
formance. Advertisers are more likely to change their stations than
to switch from newspaper to radio. Although performance can
change, total radio revenue in a market gives a buyer a good idea of
the market he is actually working with.
While retail sales and revenues deal with the size of the feast,
the number of stations in a market defines the number of guests at
the table. If there are more stations, there is less revenue for each
one, so Stick Value decreases. On the other hand, if a market has
2230 [Vol. 27:4
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few radio stations, they can all do well and Stick Value increases.
With all these variables, Stick Value may seem a nebulous con-
cept. It is. But it is important. The failure of the publicly-held
broadcasters to understand the impact of their operation on Stick
Value is a factor that creates problems for radio stations.
Many of the acquisitions in the spectrum rush following the
1996 Act were made based on Stick Value, with little regard for the
past performance of the acquired stations. However, publicly-
traded companies effectively deprive themselves of the Stick Value
of their properties because they do not have the opportunity to di-
vest of the properties. In a manufacturing company, the stock is
valued based on the financial performance of the company, not the
value of the factories or the break-up value of the companies. Be-
cause publicly-held companies are not expected to divest of their
radio properties, the Stick Value of these properties does not affect
their on-going shareholder value. Thus, some broadcasting com-
panies suffered because their new properties did not have great
cash flow.
B. Improved Property-Cash Flow Is King
The value of real estate increases as the property is improved.
The same is true for radio stations. Once a radio station becomes a
mature and profitable operating entity, its value increases above
the Stick Value. Most radio stations are appraised this way. Their
value increases as their cash flow increases.
Like commercial buildings, radio station buildings come in all
qualities. Some are lavish; some are dumpy; and most are in be-
tween. However, nobody visits radio stations. They do not need to
be beautiful to attract listeners. Improvements to radio stations
mean improved financial performance. As an investment, a mature
radio station is like a mature office building. If the building is
structurally sound and functioning properly, the typical buyer is
more interested in the rent rolls than the color of the carpet.
Likewise, a mature radio station is an investment. Return on In-
vestment (ROI) and shareholder value are more important than
plush surroundings.
Traditionally, radio stations have traded at a base of ten times
cash flow with some fluctuation because of each station's unique
properties. While many factors affect the value of a particular sta-
tion (i.e., cost of capital, number of buyers, and operation of the
station), the bench mark remained at ten times cash flow for many
2001] 2231
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years. This changed with the 1996 Telecom Act.
Cash flow is still a benchmark because of the seller's interest in
it. If a seller, for example, has cash flow of $120,000 annually from
his radio station, he would be unlikely to sell for a sum that would
not produce similar revenue when invested. The buyers, however,
are looking at other matters. Station gross revenues (not cash flow)
have become more important. In many cases, a buyer can incorpo-
rate the target station into its own operation with little increase in
its own costs. Thus, stations' revenues are incorporated into the
purchasers' revenue without the attendant on-going expense. As a
result, some companies use a revenue analysis regarding acquisi-
tions.
The revenue model generally puts a purchase price around
three times annual revenue. This figure creates an interesting
mathematical coincidence. Prior to consolidations, radio stations
operated around a 20% margin. With the changes in technology
and consolidations, stations now seek 30-40% margins. With a 20%
margin, ten times cash flow is equal to approximately two times
revenues. By increasing the purchase price to three times reve-
nues, the buyer creates a higher return for the seller (at a 20%
margin, three times revenues equals fifteen times cash flow), while
at the same time incorporating the revenues into its own operation
without being encumbered by the seller's expenses. Thus, the fif-
teen times trailing cash flow paid by the buyer actually becomes a
price of ten times going-forward cash flow for the buyer who in-
. 3creases margins.
In addition, it is important to remember that public buyers
have different interests than private buyers. A publicly held com-
pany, especially a growing company, is very concerned about reve-
nue growth. Thus, a growing public company will often be more
interested in purchasing a group of stations with $30 million in
revenue and no cash flow than in a station with $10 million in
revenue and $2 million in cash flow. Further fueling this new
model is a public company's ability to obtain capital at a lower cost
than private companies. Whether obtained through public offer-
ings, corporate bonds or their own lenders, the cost of capital for a
3. Take for example a station with revenues of $1,000,000, at 20% margins,
and cash flows of $200,000. Ten times cash flow is $2 million. Fifteen times cash
flow is $3 million. If the margin increases to 30%, ten times cash flow is $3 mil-
lion. Thus, the buyer pays ten times forward cash flow, but the seller receives fif-
teen times trailing cash flow.
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multi-billion dollar public company is significantly less than the
cost of capital for a small buyer. The result of all these changes is
that public companies are willing and able to pay higher prices for
radio stations than they could justify before the 1996 Act.
III. A HISTORY LESSON
A. Pre-1996 Act-Artificially Low Values
Until 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (here-
inafter "the F.C.C.") artificially suppressed the value of radio sta-
tions by suppressing demand through onerous ownership restric-
tions. Broadcasters were limited to twenty AM and twenty FM
stations nationally. Now, after the 1996 Act, Clear Channel Com-
munications owns more than 2200 stations, about 20% of the na-
tional total. Before 1996, a group could own only two stations of
each service (AM and FM) in a single market. Now, a single owner
may have an interest in up to eight radio stations in the largest
markets (with up to five of a single service).
Prior to the 1996 Act, most stations sold for around ten times
cash flow. Sale prices were chained to this benchmark largely be-
cause of (1) the cost of capital; (2) the lack of potential buyers; and
(3) the inability to cut expensive operations.
1. Cost Of Capital
Traditionally, most radio transactions were seller-financed or
bank-financed. A decision to buy a radio station became a simple
equation: Buyers sought to obtain a rate of return high enough to
recoup the cost of the capital plus make the investment worthwhile.
Buyers were loathe to pay more than ten times the annual cash
flow because paying more precluded obtaining a significant ROI.
This can be demonstrated with a hypothetical example. Assume a
buyer paid $200,000 cash and borrowed $1 million at 10% interest
to finance the purchase of a $1.2 million radio station ($120,000
annual cash flow). If we assume the buyer maintains the $120,000
cash flow and that the buyer could have invested $200,000 at 10%,
the cash flow just matches the investor's capital cost, leaving no
ROI. The buyer may be able to take a salary and likely gain some
equity in the station. If the buyer is a broadcaster who wants to
work at the station, and ultimately retire on the station's increased
equity, this may be a sound investment. Wall Street, investment
2001] 2233
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bankers and venture capitalists, however, have no interest in a
break-even investment. Thus, for years there was little interest in
radio stations as investments.
2. Suppressed Demand
Like any industry, broadcasting is affected by supply and de-
mand. Before the 1996 Act, there were few buyers for radio sta-
tions. As discussed above, broadcasting was not attractive to the in-
vestment community. Investors and broadcasters could own only
twenty AM and twenty FM stations nationwide. Thus, the largest
groups had either reached their ownership cap or, knowing they
were near their cap, were selective about which stations they pur-
chased. Because a company that only owned broadcasting proper-
ties was limited in size, Wall Street was not particularly interested in
the industry.
3. Operations
Consolidation has also allowed operators to cut costs. Back of-
fice costs have been reduced dramatically. Likewise, studios, sales
offices and other bricks and mortar aspects of the business have
been consolidated. Personnel are used for multiple radio stations.
In short, an operator with eight stations in a market can operate
those eight stations at less than twice the cost of operating a single
station. Thus, with consolidation, prospective purchasers feel they
can inherit the revenues of the target station without inheriting all
of their expenses.
Prior to the 1996 Act, it was difficult to save station operating
costs. It was difficult to cut back on personnel, especially announc-
ers and back-office employees. The quality of the announcers re-
flects dearly on the quality of the station's product. Each station
needed the same back office facilities. While a traffic director or
bookkeeper could handle eight stations on one market, the com-
pany could own only two stations per market and needed back of-
fice staff in each market. This redundancy was expensive but un-
avoidable.
B. The Spectrum Rush
The 1996 Act released all national ownership restrictions. The
chart below sets out single market ownership limitations from the
2234 [Vol. 27:4
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1996 Act.4
No. OF COMMERCIAL MAXIMUM MAXIMUM No. OF SAME-






14 or fewer 5 3
In economics, demand is like gravity. It is relendess. It may be
overcome temporarily, but it will win in the end. Once the owner-
ship restrictions were released, demand outpaced supply and sta-
tion values increased accordingly. Broadcasters could own hun-
dreds of stations, with billions in revenues. Broadcasters began to
attract serious interest from Wall Street. In the three years imme-
diately pre-Act, approximately 12% of all radio stations traded in
rated markets were publicly held. By 1999, 57.2% of traded stations
were publicly held." From 1993 to 1995, sales of publicly held radio
stations totaled an annual average of $1.72 billion, accounting for
6
an average of 42.9% of the total sales volume. In 1999, this volume
totaled $26.65 billion, exceeding 94% of total volume.7 In just four
years, publicly held stations became the norm in the industry.
These numbers are pregnant with inference. The volume of
transactions increased nearly seven-fold ($4.1 billion to $28.4 bil-
lion). This increase is entirely from transactions involving publicly-
held stations. Annual transactions involving publicly-held station
sales increased fifteen-fold (from $1.72 billion to $26.65 billion)
while sales of privately-owned stations actually decreased ($2.3 bil-
lion to $1.7 billion).
As the new millennium begins, the initial wave of consolida-
tion appears to be approaching completion. By the end of 1999,
56.1% of stations in the top fifty markets were consolidated, repre-
senting an average listening share of 78.2%. By 1999 the eight
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § (G), Pub. L. No. 104-104, .110 Stat. 56
(1996).
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largest groups controlled 1,805 stations. This concentration grew
more dramatically in 2000 with the merger of the two public com-
panies holding the most stations when Clear Channel Communica-
tions (520 stations) merged with AM/FM, Inc. (410 stations). With
another 2000 acquisitions, Clear Channel now operates 2200 sta-
tions.
IV. VALUATION ANALYSIS OF PUBLICLY-TRADED BROADCASTING
COMPANIES
Currently, there are about twenty publicly-traded companies
heavily involved in broadcasting. The largest of these is Clear
Channel Broadcasting (again, operating 2200 radio stations na-
tionwide). The second largest operator in terms of number of sta-
tions is Cumulus Media, which operates about 500 stations. In
1998, Clear Channel earned $1.35 billion in revenues, and in 2000
earned $4.2 billion.9 Cumulus earned $98 million in 1998 and
$223 million in 2000.10 These are rapid growth companies.
These are also companies with weak stock performance. At
year end 2000 Cumulus traded at around $4 per share, down from
$55 in March of 2000. Clear Channel now hovers around $50 per
share, down from $91 in January, 2000.11
Clear Channel has a break up value of $21 per share at three
times revenues. The break up value of Cumulus is around $19 per
share. 13 But Clear Channel trades at $50 and Cumulus at $4.
Why are these companies trading so differently? Simply put,
the fundamentals have caught up with them. Clear Channel is
profitable and Cumulus Media is not. There are no buyers inter-
ested in liquidating the companies, so break-up value is irrelevant.
Only the earnings (and potential earnings) matter. Investors do
not consider the liquidation value of these companies. This leaves
few potential suitors for the companies. Although the corporate
raiders might find these numbers interesting, they have not yet
taken to pillaging broadcast companies.
Broadcasting still has some regulatory barriers, which make it a
less then attractive industry for buyers who only want to buy the
8. Id. at 52.
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company in order to divest it. Any transaction that transfers con-
trol (changes majority ownership) needs the approval of the F.C.C.
and, in some cases, the Department of Justice. In large transac-
tions, these analyses can take many months to conduct. Some take
more than a year. If the F.C.C. believed that the new owner did not
intend to use the spectrum "in the public interest," they could deny
the transfer, which would lead to a long legal batde.
If a raider approached Cumulus Media, for instance, he might
buy the company for $8 per share. To liquidate the company
quickly, he would have to place 500 stations on the market at once.
This would depress prices. The $19 per share break up value, less
transactional expenses, might be $14 or less. Time is also an ele-
ment. The F.C.C. and the Department ofJustice might take as long
as twelve months to approve the purchase. It could take another
year or more to sell all the stations. Thus, after two years and tre-
mendous risk, the raider takes home a return of 75% on his in-
vestment. Not bad for the public, but the time, risk and cost have
kept raiders away to this point.
V. THE FUTURE
The broadcasting industry has spent five years consolidating
only to end up in the same place as before. Demand for radio sta-
tions is suppressed. The suppressing agent is now the market, not
the F.C.C. Investors are not interested in broadcasting companies
because there are no more buyers for the large companies. Here
are three simple predictions for the future of the radio industry:
The pent-up demand released by the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act has been spent. Consolidation will slow to a trickle. Ra-
dio stocks will stabilize over the next twelve to eighteen months.
They will be priced at P/E ratios around twenty. The stock prices
will be based on a broadcaster's earnings more than revenues.
The large radio companies will occasionally be swallowed up
by companies like AT&T, SBC or Microsoft. As in other industries,
values will skyrocket when a company is put in play.
Smaller publicly traded broadcasters, whose cash flow cannot
sustain shareholder value, will maintain revenues by selling their
stations, a few at a time, until they are small enough to sustain
themselves or sell as a group.
As an investment, broadcasting will hit a lull in the short term.
However, as when real estate markets are depressed, those who can
buy while prices are low will ultimately reap the greatest rewards.
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The supply of radio stations is far more limited than the supply of
commercial real estate. The value of radio spectrum will again rise
and those that can acquire stations during the hard times will be
the winners.
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